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Abstract: 
This study investigates the politics of constitution making through an analysis of the 
institutional  organization  of  the European  Union  (EU)  constitutional  convention. 
Constitutional  conventions  resemble  parliamentary  bodies  in  terms  of  their 
institutional arrangements, and need to be studied with the same sensitivity that has 
been given to the study of legislatures. This study focuses on the role of committees 
in the EU Convention and their impact on the drafting process. Using new data on 
delegate positions in the Convention, I test two competing committee composition 
hypotheses, the outlier and representative committee hypothesis, with a Monte Carlo 
simulation technique. The four main results of this study are (1) that the political 
leadership of the European convention controlled to a large extent its institutional 
organization, (2) that committees were influential in the drafting process, (3) that 
there is stronger evidence for committee outliers than for representative committees, 
and (4) that the outlying committees were slanted to the left.  
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1.  Introduction 
Drafting a constitution is a complex, often controversial, and highly consequential political 
process. Charged with drafting a constitution, constitutional conventions follow a set of 
rules to reach agreement over controversial issues. Such bodies resemble parliaments in 
terms  of  their  institutional  arrangements.  This  study  investigates  the  institutional 
organization  of  the  European  constitutional  convention  and  focuses  on  the  role  and 
composition of committees. Voters in France and the Netherlands rejected the Constitution, 
even though it was drafted in a supposedly highly transparent and representative manner. 
This study investigates the institutional organization of the European Convention and its 
representativeness as a constitution-making body.  
  The article is structured as follows. First, I define the term constitutional convention 
and  show  that  the  literature  on  constitution  making  has  insufficiently  addressed  the 
institutional structure of such conventions. Second, I discuss the importance of committees 
in  the  EU  convention  and  analyze  the  committee  assignment  process,  the  rules  of 
procedure, and the substantial role of committees in the drafting process. I demonstrate that 
the rules in the Convention provided ambiguous behavioural incentives to delegates. On the 
one hand, delegates could self-select onto committees, creating the potential for outlying 
committees.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Presidency  of  the  Convention  tried  to  control  the 
process by balancing representation according to the component groups of the Convention, 
suggesting that committees would be representative of the Convention. Finally, I test these 
composition  hypotheses  in  a  Monte  Carlo  simulation  using  new  position  estimates  for 
delegates in the EU Convention.  
  The main results of this study are (1) that the political leadership of the European 
convention controlled the institutional organization to a large extent, (2) that committees   2 
were influential in the drafting process, and (3) that there is strong evidence for committee 
outliers than for representative committees. Outlying committees were slanted more to the 
left than to the right.  
 
2.  Constitution Making in the European Union  
It is widely acknowledged that institutions and constitutional rules have a significant impact 
on  the  functioning  of  a  political  system  (Lijphart  1999;  Tsebelis  2002).  But  political 
institutions are themselves the product of politics. One widely-used drafting process is the 
constitutional convention, defined as a temporary, non-legislative body convened for the 
purpose of drafting or revising a constitution (Fafard and Reid, 1991).
1 Recent estimates 
suggest that a participatory drafting process is quite common around the world. Of the 
nearly 200 new constitutions drafted between 1975 and 2002 in countries at risk of conflict, 
more than 60 percent were negotiated in an inclusive body, such as a constituent assembly, 
a  convention,  or  a  legislature  (Widner  2005,  p.8).  The  participatory  nature  and 
parliamentary-style organization characterize constitutional conventions. They can involve 
                                                 
1  I  use  the  term  constitutional  convention,  constituent  assembly  and  constitutional  conference 
interchangeably.  The  definition  used  here  excludes  special  legislative  committees  or  constitutional 
commissions which constitute subsets of existing legislatures. Surprisingly, there are to date no systematic 
comparative studies that study constitution making in constitutional conventions. Historical studies provide 
detailed accounts of the proceedings of particular conventions and constitution making processes (Fafard and 
Reid  1991;  Goldwin  and  Kaufman  1988;  McWhinney  1981)  Conflict  resolution  studies  emphasize  the 
significance of a participatory constitution making process after war. These studies emphasize that political 
institutions are a key element for successful reconstruction (Cowen and Coyne 2005; for Iraq see: Kurrild-
Klitgaard 2004), and that a more participatory constitution making process can reduce post-ratification levels 
of violence in developing countries (Widner 2005). A closely related literature focuses on the question of 
what  constitutional  arrangements  are  best  for  any  given  country  (Lijphart  1999,  2004;  Reynolds  2002). 
Underscoring  the  normative  consequences  of  constitutions,  these  studies  often  put  forward  concrete 
suggestions how constitutions can be engineered to bring about a “strengthened democracy” (Reynolds 2002, 
2). The theoretically most rigorous studies of constitution making processes come from the constitutional 
political  economy  literature,  which  focuses  on  the  process  of  constitutional  bargaining  under  procedural 
constraints (e.g. Douglas and Maser 1987; Elster 1993; Elster 1995; Riker 1986; Voigt 1999). The prevalent 
view is that democracy can be considered a two-stage process: “in the first stage the rules of the political 
game to be played in stage two are drawn up; in stage two the game is played” (Mueller 2005, 57). The most 
researched convention is the US Constitutional Convention, for which voting data are available (Dougherty 
and Heckelman 2006; Jillson 1981, 1988; Londregan 1999; McGuire 2003).   3 
many groups of society, often including minorities, their members are elected or appointed, 
and they dissolve after their task of drafting a constitution is finished.  
  Convened in 2002, the European Convention was the first constitutional convention 
of the European Union. Its task was to revise the existing constitutional framework of the 
EU,  which  was  created  by  a  set  of  international  treaties  between  member  state 
governments.  Constitutional  amendments  in  the  European  Union  have  so  far  been 
exclusively made through Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), in which the heads of 
state or government decide unanimously, and behind closed doors, on constitutional change 
(Garrett 1992; Hug and König 2002; Moravcsik 1998; Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis 1999; 
Slapin 2006, forthcoming).
2 Faced with the prospect of enlargement of the European Union 
at the end of the 1990s, member state governments acknowledged that decision making 
needed to become more efficient and transparent. But the subsequent constitutional reform 
in  2000  through  an  IGC  led  to  the  opposite  result.  In  search  for  compromise,  the 
governments agreed to change the EU's legislative institutions in a way that made decision 
making more difficult (Tsebelis 2002; Tsebelis and Yataganas 2002). This set the stage for 
the European Convention as a more transparent and participatory way to revise the EU's 
constitutional provisions. Whereas IGCs more closely resemble an international bargaining 
situation  in  which  sovereign  governments  negotiate  under  the  unanimity  rule,  the 
constitutional convention was established in order to include more political actors of the 
European Union in the constitution making process. In 2001, EU member states agreed in a 
declaration  to  establish  the  European  Convention.  Its  task  was  defined  in  terms  of 
“challenges” the EU supposedly was facing: 
                                                 
2 Important constitutional  amendments through IGCs include changes to  Council voting rules in order to 
create the single market in the European Union (through the Single European Act in 1987), creation of the 
monetary union (through the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993), and the establishing of a bicameral parliament in 
the European Union, at least in some policy areas (Maastricht 1993, Amsterdam 1997, and Nice 2000).   4 
 
The Union needs to become more democratic, more transparent and more efficient. It 
also has to resolve three basic challenges: how to bring citizens, and primarily the young, 
closer to the European design and the European institutions, how to organize politics and 
the European political area in an enlarged Union and how to develop the Union into a 
stabilizing factor and a model in the new, multipolar world (European Council 2001). 
 
  The  European  Convention  was  thus  created  because  the  existing  constitutional 
provisions were perceived as an unworkable basis for the future of the EU. The primary 
mandate  of  the  Convention  was  to  consider  “key  issues  arising  for  the  Union's  future 
development and try to identify the various possible responses” (European Council 2001). 
Member state governments wanted the Convention to prepare a draft or potentially several 
constitutional drafts, which would then be decided by a subsequent IGC, a procedure that 
can be conceived as a principal-agent process (König 2006).    
 
3.  The Institutional Organization of the EU Convention 
The  following  sections  discuss  the  composition  of  the  European  Convention,  the 
constitutional drafting process, the committee system, and the power of these committees. 
 
Basic Composition 
How was this new Convention organized? When EU member state governments decided to 
install the convention, they also decided on its basic composition. The convention included 
a  Presidency  (including  a  chairman  and  two  vice-chairmen),  representatives  from  the 
parliaments (two per member state), representatives from the governments themselves (one 
per  member  state),  sixteen  representatives  from  the  European  Parliament,  and  two 
representatives from the European Commission. In addition, given that enlargement of the   5 
EU was imminent, all thirteen EU candidate countries were represented as well with two 
members each from their respective national parliament and one from each government. 
The convention mandate furthermore provided for the same number of alternate members 
who would replace members at meetings they could not attend, thus doubling the number 
of delegates. Finally, thirteen official observers to the Convention were invited to represent 
the  advisory  bodies  of  the  European  Union.
5  In  total,  the  Convention  comprised  220 
delegates.  
  Presidency of the Convention. In setting up the Convention, EU governments agreed 
to  appoint  a  high-profile  leadership,  rather  than  have  the  Convention  select  its  own 
chairperson. They agreed to appoint former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, 
with  the  large  states  imposing  their  will  despite  objections  from  smaller  countries 
(Magnette  and  Nicolaïdis  2004).  The  European  Council  nominated  two  former  Prime 
Ministers  as  Vice-Chairmen,  Giuliano  Amato  (Italy)  and  Jean-Luc  Dehaene  (Belgium). 
Together, these three politicians formed the Presidency of the Convention whose task it was 
to “pave the way for the opening of the Convention's proceedings by drawing conclusions 
from the public debate” (European Council 2001).  
  Steering committee of the Convention (Praesidium). Member states also installed a 
steering committee of the Convention, charged with providing an initial working basis. This 
so-called “Praesidium” was  composed of the Presidency and ten other members drawn 
from the Convention (the representatives of those countries holding the Council Presidency, 
two  national  parliament  representatives,  two  European  Parliament  representatives,  two 
Commission representatives, one candidate country representative). The Presidency, alone 
and together with the Praesidium, were the principal agenda-setters in the Convention.  
                                                 
5 The advisory bodies represented were the Committee of Regions, the Economic and Social Committee,    6 
 
The Constitutional Drafting Process 
The constitutional drafting process in the European Convention can be divided into five 
phases, shown in Figure 1. In the first phase, the steering committee (Praesidium) created 
several committees (called working groups and discussion circles) which were supposed to 
assist in the drafting process. In the second phase, each committee submitted a report to the 
Praesidium.  Subsequently,  in  the  third  phase,  the  Praesidium  drafted  the  constitutional 
proposals  and  presented  them  to  the  Convention.  In  the  fourth  phase,  delegates  in  the 
Convention  were  allowed  to  submit  amendments  to  the  constitutional  proposals  of  the 
Praesidium.  This  sparked  the  production  of  more  than  6,000  amendment  documents. 
However, in line with the rules of procedure of the Convention, they were never voted on. 
Instead, the Praesidium conceived them as suggestions by the Convention delegates.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
In the fifth phase, on the basis of the proposed amendments, the Praesidium presented its 
revised constitutional proposals. This resulted in the final “draft constitution”, which was 
then presented to the heads of government at the following Intergovernmental Conference. 
The  drafting  process  demonstrates  the  importance  of  the  Praesidium  as  the  steering 
committee  of  the  Convention,  and  previous  studies  have  emphasized  its  various 
institutional and positional means of agenda-setting (Crum, 2004; Tsebelis, 2005; Tsebelis 
and Proksch, 2007). Analyzing the final three phases in the Convention, Tsebelis finds 
extensive  procedural  control  exercised  by  the  Praesidium  under  the  chairmanship  of 
Giscard  d'Estaing  (Tsebelis  2005).  The  rules  of  procedure,  primarily  written  by  the   7 
Praesidium,  did  not  allow  any  votes  to  be  taken  in  the  Convention.  This  enabled  the 
Presidency to summarize debates, thus strengthening its role in the drafting process.
6 But 
how did the Praesidium solve the complex task of constitutional drafting and come up with 
its proposals?  
  This poses a puzzle for the institutional organization of the Convention. On the one 
hand, there was a powerful steering committee, the Praesidium, with significant agenda-
setting powers. On the other hand, the Praesidium also installed a number of committees to 
prepare the draft. Others have speculated on the fact that ideological outliers might have 
played a substantial role in the Convention (Benoit et al. 2005, p. 307; Brown, 2003, p. 3). 
The co-existence of a strong agenda setter and an elaborate committee system focuses the 
question  about  the  institutional  organization  on  the  role  of  committees  in  drafting  the 
constitution.  
 
The Committee System  
The  rules  of  procedure  of  the  European  Convention  provided  the  possibility  to  set  up 
committees, called working groups and discussion circles. Committees could be created at 
the request of the steering committee or of a significant number of Convention members, 
but the specific task of the committee was determined by the Convention leadership alone.
7 
Table  1  lists  the  fourteen  committees  of  the  European  Convention.  The  first  group  of 
committees includes those dealing with specific policy areas (economic, foreign, defence, 
security and justice, and social policies). The second group includes nine committees which 
                                                 
6 König and Slapin (2006) estimate that the actual decision rule in the Convention was in fact a qualified 
consensus,  something  less  than  unanimity  (as  it  is  used  for  IGCs)  but  more  than  simple  majority.  They 
conlude  that  this  allowed  delegates  to  make  major  institutional  changes  not  possible  at  previous  treaty 
negotiations. 
7 Article 15, Rules of Procedure of the European Convention, European Convention Document CONV 09/02, 
available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00009en2.pdf    8 
addressed institutional issues. Remarkably, none of these committees dealt with the EU's 
major legislative and executive institutions (voting rule in the Council of Ministers, size 
and composition of the European Commission). Even though the Praesidium had initially 
considered  a  working  group  on  institutional  questions  (Praesidium  2002c),  it  later 
specifically prevented the creation of such a working group in order to better “exercise its 
role in structuring the debate” (Praesidium 2002d). Thus, the mandates of the working 
groups  covered  institutional  provisions  which  did  not  include  the  composition  of  the 
Commission, the Council voting rule, or the Presidency of the Council, but instead dealt 
with the simplification of legal instruments, the specific budgetary procedure, and the Court 
of Justice.   
  The average committee had 36 members and met 7 times. In terms of size, the 
committees  fall  into  three  categories.  The  smallest  committees  were  the  so-called 
discussion circles. These committees had the shortest duration and dealt with very narrow 
questions. They were installed by the Praesidium toward the end of the Convention, just 
before it was about to submit its constitutional proposals. The medium-sized committees 
were  the  six  working  groups  that  were  set-up  first  by  the  Praesidium.  The  largest 
committees were the policy committees of the Convention. By far the largest committee 
was the working group on Social Europe, representing one third of the convention. It was 
the only working group that was installed following the demand of a “significant number” 
of Convention delegates.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
  After the committees had been set-up, the Praesidium determined their mandates. In 
order to define the jurisdictions, the steering committee came up with several questions to   9 
be addressed by each committee. In all instances, the Praesidium asked the committees to 
come up with several feasible alternatives, and sometimes also to identify the constitutional 
status quo. For example, the Working Group on National Parliaments was asked to assess 
the role of the national parliaments in the present architecture of the European Union and 
the  national  arrangements  that  function  best.  Then,  the  committee  should  propose  new 
mechanisms and procedures at national or European level. In sum, the committees in the 
European Convention were created by the Praesidium in order to prepare the drafting of 
constitutional proposals by revealing issue alternatives.  
 
Committee Assignment 
Committee assignment was a two step process. First, the Praesidium asked delegates to 
self-select themselves onto committees. Second, the Praesidium took a final decision on 
each committee's composition. In practice, the delegates were put into the different groups 
they asked for and the Praesidium made minor modifications. Because data on delegates' 
committee  membership  requests  were  not  archived,  it  is  impossible  to  retrospectively 
determine  which  requests  were  fulfilled  and  which  ones  were  not.  However,  there  is 
indirect evidence that suggests that the committee composition largely corresponded to a 
self-selection  process.  The  Praesidium  decided  that  if  any  member  of  the  Convention 
expressed  dissatisfaction  with  the  assignments,  flexibility  could  be  shown  by  the 
chairpersons  on  a  bilateral  basis  and  the  composition  be  adjusted  (Praesidium  of  the 
European Convention 2002c).
8  
                                                 
8 A staff member of the Convention confirmed that the Praesidium decided to increase the size of committees 
according to the number of requests, personal communication of the author with a member from the European 
Convention Secretariat, 7 February 2006.    10 
  It was a declared goal of the Praesidium to ensure a balanced representation in the 
committees, in particular with regard to the different component groups and nationalities 
(Praesidium  of  the  European  Convention  2002b).  Table  1  also  lists  the  committee 
assignments according to the component groups of the convention. Several results stand 
out. First, in almost all instances the component groups were represented with at least one 
member  on  each  committee  (excluding  the  observers  in  the  convention).  Second,  a 
comparison between the average committee assignment and the actual seat share of the 
component  groups  shows  that  candidate  countries  were  underrepresented  and  member 
states and supranational institutions were overrepresented. The European Commission was 
the only component group with only one representative in each committee. The Presidency 
of the Convention (Amato, Dehaene) participated in five out of the fourteen committees. 
  The distribution of committee assignments in Table 1 does not yield conclusive 
evidence as to whether committees were outliers or not. Take the example of the Working 
Group  on  National  Parliaments. The  delegates  from  the  national  parliaments  had  their 
largest relative representation in this committee, controlling almost 75% of the committee 
seats.  On  the  one  hand,  this  might  be  evidence  for  the  committee  outlier  hypothesis, 
assuming that national parliamentarians are homogeneous preference outliers. For example, 
the delegates could all demand more involvement of national parliaments in EU decision 
making processes. On the other hand, their large representation could as well be evidence 
for a representative hypothesis, because these delegates understand the issues better and 
have the most information available about the status quo and feasible alternatives. In this 
context,  committee  assignment  captures  the  notion  of  intensity  rather  than  location  of 
preferences (Krehbiel 1990, 1991). In sum, the  raw composition data  suggests that the 
official  goal  of  the  steering  committee  to  reach  a  balanced  representation  between  the   11 
component groups was indeed achieved, but it does not give any indication as to whether 
committees were outliers or not. 
 
Rules of Procedure of the Committees 
While the component groups were represented in the committees, the Praesidium ensured 
from the very beginning that it remained under control of the constitutional drafting process 
(Tsebelis  2005).  This  included  also  the  rules  of  procedure  for  the  committees.  The 
Praesidium  agreed  that  the  mandate  of  the  working  groups  should  focus  on  a  limited 
number of questions which could not be examined in depth in the plenary. Furthermore, the 
Praesidium decided that each working group would be chaired by a Praesidium member, 
the  official  reason  being  that  the  “consistency  of  the  work”  could  thus  be  ensured 
(Praesidium of the European Convention 2002a). Through the committee chairmen, the 
Praesidium was able monitor the proceedings and the work of the committees. A group of 
twelve Convention delegates from Austria, Sweden, and Finland (the 1995 enlargement 
states) challenged this unilateral definition of the procedures. In a letter addressed to the 
President, the group acknowledged the importance of the committees and demanded that 
the designation of chairpersons of the committees  should be settled by the committees 
themselves, and not by the Praesidium. Defending the selection of chairpersons, President 
Giscard d'Estaing responded that the Praesidium would bear in mind the concerns of the 
group for other committees to be set-up.
9 However, as demonstrated in Table 1, the steering 
committee decided not to take into account these considerations. Instead, all chairmanships 
of the committees were held by the Praesidium. 
                                                 
9  Exchange  of  letters,  European  Convention  Document  CONV  55/02,  available  from 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00055en2.pdf   12 
  In line with the Praesidium's role as agenda-setter, the committees were explicitly 
told  not  to  establish  draft  texts. Instead,  they  would  prepare  reports  to  the  Convention 
“containing the main elements of the  analysis carried out and the options identified to 
respond  to  the  questions  submitted  to  them”  (Praesidium  of  the  European  Convention 
2002c). The committees' formal role was thus largely informational to reduce uncertainty 
by providing information about issue alternatives. The next section evaluates the results of 
the work in committees and determines the impact of committees on the constitutional 
drafting process.  
 
Committee Influence 
All  committees  sent  final  reports  to  the  Praesidium,  which  then  prepared  the  formal 
constitutional  proposals  to  the  Convention.  To understand  the  role  of  committees,  it  is 
essential to determine the significance of these  reports in terms of their impact on the 
drafting  process.  I  choose  the  following  approach  to  measure  the  level  of  influence  of 
committees  in  the  constitutional  drafting  process.  With  regard  to  each  issue  under 
discussion, a committee could essentially propose a single proposal (recommendation) or 
several alternatives (options). The latter was the official task of the committees. Using the 
final committee reports, I counted the number of issues for which a committee proposed 
recommendations and the number of issues for which it proposed options. The findings are 
reported in Table 2. Contrary to the mandate, the committees overwhelmingly proposed 
recommendations,  and  not  options.  On  average,  each  committee  report  included  about 
seventeen  concrete  proposals  for  the  draft  EU  constitution.  The  number  of 
recommendations range from six for the Discussion Circle on Own Resources to thirty-
three for the Working Group on Freedom, Security and Justice. In contrast, the committee   13 
reports barely included options. Five committees did not propose any options at all, and of 
the ones that did most included options for only one issue. Only the Working Group on 
Economic  Governance,  one  of  the  most  active  ones  in  terms  of  number  of  meetings, 
proposed  more  options  than  recommendations,  suggesting  that  divisions  within  this 
committee were too great to overcome. 
  These numbers suggest that committees were able to find agreement on most issues, 
thus being actively engaged in influencing the draft constitution. To answer the question 
about  their  influence,  I  examine  (a)  how  often  the  Convention  leadership  proposed 
committee  recommendations,  and  (b)  how  often  the  leadership  proposed  one  of  the 
suggested alternatives. The success rates indicate that most committees were influential 
institutions (third and sixth column in Table 2). On average, three out of four committee 
recommendations  were  proposed  by  the  Praesidium.  If  committees  suggested  several 
alternatives  for  an  issue,  it  was  guaranteed  that  one  of  them  was  proposed  by  the 
Praesidium.  These  findings  shed  new  light  on  the  drafting  process  in  the  European 
Convention. They suggest that the steering committee's proposals came to a large extent 
from  the  committee  reports,  thus  underscoring  the  importance  of  the  institutional 
organization for the overall outcome.   
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
4.  Measuring Representativeness in the EU Convention 
The analysis of the committee system of the European Convention suggests that delegates 
had two types of incentives. They themselves could self-select onto committees, but the 
Convention leadership wanted to ensure a supposedly balanced representation.    14 
 
Representative Hypothesis 
Another way of stating that committees were representative of the Convention is to say that 
the assignment process was random. Therefore, the null hypothesis is that there is nothing 
systematic  in  the  organization  of  constitutional  committees  and  that  they  are  therefore 
nothing  more  than  random  outcomes.  The  Praesidium  adjusted  the  committee  size 
according  to  demand  and  made  modifications  to  the  overall  composition  to  assure  a 
“balanced  representation”.  Furthermore,  all  committees  included  delegates  from  each 
component  group  of  the  European  Convention.  Committees  did  not  have  gatekeeping 
power  because  the  Praesidium  could  choose  to  propose  committee  proposals  to  the 
Convention  or  ignore  them.  In  short,  this  view  suggests  that  committees  were  in  fact 
ideologically representative of the Convention.
10 
 
Outlying/non-representative hypothesis  
Certain aspects of the institutional organization  challenge the representative hypothesis.   
Committee assignments in the Convention were governed by self-selection, a process that 
features prominently in legislatures and is related to re-election motives (Shepsle 1978). In 
the  Convention,  the  motive  for  self-selection  onto  committees  was  the  prospect  for 
                                                 
10 Legislative scholars have addressed the question why committees exist and whether they are representative 
extensively  for  the  US  Congress.  Both  theories  share  the  assumption  that  legislative  decision-making  in 
committees will eventually be one-dimensional, thus facilitating the analysis by allowing the application of 
the median voter theorem (Black 1958). According to the informational efficiency theory, legislators have 
one-dimensional preferences over the outcomes of legislation, x, defined as the sum of a policy, p, and an 
exogenous shock,   (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989; Krehbiel 1991; Krishna and Morgan 2001). Members 
of the floor are uncertain about the policy consequences of the shock. But this information can be provided by 
a  specialized  committee.  When  the  committee  reports  a  bill,  the  floor  receives  a  signal  and  uses  this 
information to amend the bill so that the final outcome is as close as possible to its most preferred point. 
Gilligan and Krehbiel show that the range in which the committee credibly reveals   can become smaller as 
the  difference  between  the  median  floor  member  and  the  median  committee  member  becomes  smaller. 
Therefore, one empirical implication of this model is that the difference between the committee median and 
the floor median should be small, and committees should be representative of the floor.   15 
influence  on  the  constitutional  draft  through  work  in  committees.  According  to  this 
perspective, committees are not representative because only ideologically biased delegates 
will  be  motivated  to  join  committees.  This  hypothesis  is  different  from  the  standard 
Congressional literature on committees. According to this literature, legislative committees 
outliers  exist  with  respect  to  their  jurisdiction. Because  legislators  are  interested  in  re-
election, the exclusive committee jurisdictions combined with gate-keeping powers ensure 
that logrolls can be enforced.
11 Here, I argue that committees might be unrepresentative on 
the primary dimension of conflict in the Convention, because of the incentives provided to 
delegates to self-select onto committees.  
   
Monte Carlo Simulation 
Following Groseclose's study on committee composition in the U.S. Congress (Groseclose 
1994),  I test these hypotheses using Monte Carlo simulations, a technique that has been 
applied to the US and EU legislatures (Espino and Franz 2004; McElroy 2006; Peterson 
and Wrighton 1998). Groseclose's method is a departure from earlier tests of committee 
composition and has the advantage of making few assumptions about the distribution of the 
data.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
 
  A  common  technique  used  to  test  committee  composition  hypotheses  is  the 
difference of means tests, which assumes that (1) the preferences of committees and floor 
                                                 
11 According to the distributive benefits theory, committees should not be representative of the floor (Shepsle 
and Weingast 1987; Weingast and Marshall 1988). Committees exist in order to enforce logroll agreements 
between special interests in the legislature. In this model, each dimension of an n-dimensional policy space 
represents a policy area. Because each outlying group does not have a majority within its respective area, 
there  is  an  incentive  for  logrolling  because  together  the  outliers  do  control  a  majority.  Two  empirical 
implications of this model are that specialized committees have gatekeeping and agenda-setting power and 
that  members  are  allowed  to  self-select  onto  the  committees  of  their  choice  (Shepsle  1978),  causing 
committees to be preference outliers.   16 
members follow a normal distribution and (2) that the mean, not the median, score is the 
correct  test  statistic.  The  advantage  of  the  Monte  Carlo  technique  is  that  it  makes  no 
assumption  about  the  distribution  of  preferences  by  using  the  actual  distribution  of 
ideological  scores.  First,  for  each  committee  of  size  n,  I  generate  20,000  hypothetical 
committees of the same size. This is done by randomly selecting n committee members 
(without replacing) from the Convention population.
12 Using ideological estimates for each 
delegate, I then record the median score for each simulated committee, thus producing 
20,000 median voter scores. These median scores constitute an approximate distribution for 
the  median  of  a  committee,  and  statistical  tests  can  be  conducted  on  the  basis  of  this 
distribution.
13  
The outlying hypothesis states that the actual committee median is a homogeneous 
preference  outlier.  There  are,  however,  two  possible  definitions  of  what  an  outlying 
committee means. An outlying committee can be defined as outlying in a certain direction 
(directional outlier hypothesis) and as outlying without any further assumption about the 
direction  (non-directional  outlier  hypothesis).  Figure  2  demonstrates  the  difference.  I 
calculate the p-value for the directional definition as the proportion of simulated committee 
medians that are at least as outlying as the actual committee (shaded area in the left graph 
in  Figure  2).  Define  F  as  the  Monte  Carlo  approximation  of  the  distribution  of  the 
committee medians. Let mC be the observed committee median and mF be the floor median. 
Then the p-value is:  
                                                 
12 An alternative approach would be to sample with replacement, assuming that the observed Convention 
composition is just one of many hypothetical compositions. 
13 In contrast to  the  Monte Carlo  approach, in which the null hypothesis is  that committees  are random 
outcomes,  another  testing  approach  assumes  that  committee  selection  is  not  random  and  that  the  only 
stochastic component of the test are measurement errors of members' preferences (Londregan and Snyder 
1994).   17 
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The non-directional version of the outlying committee hypothesis suggests that a committee 
median might as well have occured in the opposite direction of the ideological space and 
that the p-value will be greater. Let mS be the median of the Monte Carlo distribution, 
which is equal to mF if the committee and floor have an odd number of members. Then the 
p-value is calculated as follows. 
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This algorithm takes into account that the sampling distribution of committee medians may 
not be symmetric, simply doubling the p-value would therefore be inappropriate. If any of 
these p-values are less than 5%, the null hypothesis of a random outcome is rejected. 
  From the p-values for the outlying committee hypothesis, it is straightforward to 
calculate the p-value for the representative committee hypothesis. A committee is defined 
as representative if its median is close to a random outcome, the latter meaning the median 
of the sampling distribution. P-values are simply the proportion of simulated committee 
medians that are closer to mS than mC. Because the non-directional outlier p-value is the 
proportion of simulated committees that are at least as outlying as the committee median, 
one simply needs to subtract this value from 1:  outlier nd represent p p . 1  = . 
 
5.  The Data 
Testing  the  hypotheses  requires  the  estimation  of  the  most  salient  individual  delegate 
positions in the European Convention. But a major problem for this kind of estimation is   18 
the fact that no votes were taken in the Convention.
14 The only revealed preferences of the 
delegates can be found in speeches and in amendments that could be proposed at the end 
with  regard  to  the  Praesidium's  proposals  (see  second  to  last  phase  in  Figure  1).  The 
solution to the position estimation problem proposed by this study is the use of amendment 
endorsements. After the Praesidium had presented its proposals, delegates were able to put 
forward drafting changes for each individual constitutional article. Such amendments could 
be proposed by any delegate (including alternate members) or by a group of delegates, but 
were not voted on. Instead, the Praesidium presented a revised constitutional draft based on 
the proposed amendments. The proposed amendments were retrieved from the Convention 
website which includes an archive of all Convention documents.
15 
  In order to estimate delegate positions, I treat the endorsements of amendments by 
the delegates as quasi-votes. This approach is based on the assumption of sincere voting. 
First, I assume that all delegates who support an amendment would also vote for it. Second, 
I  assume  that  delegates  who  do  not  endorse  an  amendment  either  oppose  it  or  are 
indifferent between the amendment and the proposal. This assumption is not unrealistic, 
because the costs for supporting an amendment were low, so that it is fair to assume that 
those who wanted to express a position could do so.
16 There were no rules on the format of 
the amendment. Most amendments concerned specific articles and are therefore short in 
length, and delegates could sign up to amendments that others had written. I therefore count 
an  abstention  as  a  vote  against  a  proposed  amendment.  This  makes  sense  because  the 
Praesidium  could  infer  the  level  of  support  for  an  amendment  only  from  the  list  of 
                                                 
14 See Tsebelis (2005) for how the Praesidium gained agenda-setting power by insisting on this rule.  
15  The  amendments  can  be  found  at  the  following  address:  http://european-
convention.eu.int/amendemTrait.asp?lang=EN. 
16 However, there is evidence that even during the few months when delegates could propose amendments, 
the Praesidium tried to limit the overall number of amendments (Tsebelis and Proksch 2007).   19 
delegates who endorsed it. The estimation includes those delegates that were members of 
the Convention during the amendment process (February until June 2003), but excludes 
delegates that had left the Convention prior to this period. A small number of delegates 
were replaced during the amendment process. In these cases, I estimate a common position 
for each replaced/replacing delegate pair.  
  In total, I analyze 3,101 amendments proposed for the preamble, part I and II of the 
constitution, which constitute about half of all proposed amendments. These parts contain 
the most relevant constitutional provisions and are the ones covered by the committees. The 
coding approach was as follows. An issue was included in the dataset if it fulfilled two 
criteria:  (1) it  was  a  substantive  amendment,  and  (2)  it  was  supported  by  at  least  two 
delegates. The first criterion excludes linguistic, stylistic, and grammatical amendments. 
The second criterion ensures that an amendment received a minimum level of support in the 
Convention. For example, sixteen delegates proposed to include the term “Christianity” 
into the preamble. These delegates were then coded as 1, and all others as 0. This procedure 
takes  into  account  that  identical  amendments  were  proposed  in  different  documents  or 
several times. A pure extraction of delegate names from the documents would therefore 
yield biased results, because the same amendment in two documents would be coded as two 
different ones, not as the same one.   
  The resulting data matrix includes amendment endorsements on 491 issues for 232 
delegates, a total of 113,912 actor positions.
17 The primary delegate level positions are then 
retrieved using the W-NOMINATE scaling procedure (Poole and Rosenthal 1985). This 
procedure performs parametric unfolding of binary choice data. Given the matrix of binary 
choices  by  delegates  (endorsement,  no  endorsement)  over  the  issues,  W-NOMINATE 
                                                 
17 The number of delegates is slightly larger than the official number, because of the delegate replacements 
that took place during the amendment process.   20 
produces a configuration of delegates and outcome points for the Yes and No alternatives 
for  each  quasi-roll  call  using  a  probabilistic  model  of  choice.  I  estimate  both  two-
dimensional and one-dimensional W-NOMINATE coordinates.  Positions  for  delegates 
who left the Convention before the amendment process are imputed with the positions of 
their replacements. With a few additional assumptions, the scaling procedure also allows 
for the estimation of the agenda-setter's (Praesidium) proposal. Suppose that the members 
of the Praesidium must state a position with regard to the proposed amendments. If the 
steering committee acts as a unitary actor, it should always reject amendments from the 
floor.  In  practice,  some  members  actively  endorsed  amendments.  For  these  members, 
amendment  support  is  coded  in  the  same  way  as  for  the  delegates,  as  “1”,  and  “0” 
otherwise.  Those  members  that  never  endorsed any  amendment  (e.g.  President  Giscard 
d'Estaing) are coded as “0” on each issue. This procedure of estimating delegate positions 
has the advantage of using revealed positions and estimating positions for all delegates.
18  
  There  are  two  alternative  approaches  to  estimating  positions  in  the  European 
Convention.  The  first  one  is  a  computer-based  content  analysis  using  speeches  and 
amendments (Benoit et al. 2005), whereas the second approach is based on a survey of the 
delegates themselves (König et al. 2006). Benoit and his co-authors pool the texts available 
from the Convention archive for each national party and then estimate party positions using 
external reference documents. They find that party positions estimated by their method 
correlate well with expert survey estimates of national party positions. A drawback of this 
methodology is the requirement that the documents being analyzed must all be in the same 
language.  They  solve  this  problem  by  using  only  English  language  texts,  but  lose  a 
                                                 
18 In both estimations (one  and two-dimensional),  the  cutoff criterion for quasi roll calls  in terms of the 
minimum proportion on the minority side for the amendment to be included was set to 0.005. The cutoff 
criterion for delegates in terms of the minimum number of amendments endorsed to be included was set to 0.    21 
significant amount of data. In contrast, I include all language versions of the amendments in 
my analysis. Second, they consider the national party as the natural unit for analysis and 
pool all documents of the respective national party delegates. However, there are no a 
priori reasons why national parties should be key actors in the Convention. For instance, 
one could as well make the argument that the unit of analysis should be European parties, 
member  states  versus  candidate  countries,  large  state  versus  small  state,  etc.  The  third 
problem is that they do not include documents authored by more than one delegate, causing 
them to lose more cases. Thus, while their analysis does provide estimates for national 
party positions, their method does not yield individual estimates for each delegate and is 
thus inadequate for the research problem of this study.  
  The  other  approach  estimates  positions  from  a  survey  with  a  standardized 
questionnaire (König et al. 2006; used by König and Slapin 2006, Jensen et al. 2007). 
König and his co-authors determined the controversial topics from the initial mandate of 
the Convention and then sent out a questionnaire to all Convention delegates. This yields an 
impressive amount of actor positions. Because of the response problems associated with 
surveys,  they  limit  their  final  data  set  to  90  delegate  positions.  They  exclude  alternate 
members and reduce the data to one governmental delegate per country, two parliamentary 
representatives per country and one delegate per position from the European Parliament and 
Commission.  While  this  approach  yields  individual  Convention  delegate  estimates,  the 
reduction  also  assumes  that  alternates  and  members  have  the  same  position  as  do 
government representatives from multiple parties. In contrast, the approach in this study 
allows  for  the  possibility  that  the  positions  vary,  which  is  important  because  alternate 
members participated in the committees just like full members did and no votes in the   22 
plenary were ever taken. Thus, a dataset with individual positions for all delegates is the 
most adequate to address the research problem of committee representativeness. 
 
6.  Delegate Positions in the European Convention 
The  two-dimensional  W-NOMINATE  scores  are  shown  in  Figure  3a-c,  with  delegates 
being  identified  by  their  respective  component  group  and  by  European  political  party 
affiliation (if available). In contrast to the view taken by the Praesidium, the delegates of 
each  component  groups  did  not  form  coherent  coalitions  (left  figure).  For  example, 
delegates representing member state governments did not form a coherent block against 
their national parliaments. Yet, almost all delegates from the European Parliament are on 
one  side  of  the  second  dimension,  while  delegates  from  national  parliaments  and 
governments are on the other side. The rest of the component groups are equally dispersed. 
Only some delegates from candidate country governments form a coalitional unit on the 
first dimension. Thus, looking at the component groups alone does not give a satisfactory 
answer to the question of position taking in the European Convention. The second figure 
shows the same positions, but highlighted according to the European party affiliation of 
delegates.
19 This analysis shows a sharp divide between Socialists (S) and Conservatives 
(P) on the first dimension. This suggests that many disagreements over left-right policy 
might have also driven disagreement about institutions and constitutional provisions. This 
result is in line with previous empirical analyses of the Convention. Benoit et al. (2005) 
                                                 
19 European party affiliation is determined by membership of the delegate’s national party in the European 
Parliament groups. Delegates which are not members of the EP groups (from candidate countries) are not 
classified.    23 
find  a  statistically  significant  relationship  between  national  party  positions  in  the 
Convention and general Left-Right expert scores.
20  
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
  I complement the ex post inspection and interpretation of the estimated dimensions 
with a more systematic regression analysis. Similar to Benoit et al. (2005) and Jensen et al. 
(2007), I test several hypotheses of delegate position taking in the EU Convention. First, I 
test whether there was any  significant difference between the institutional affiliation of 
delegates  (governments,  national  parties,  supranational  delegates).  Second,  I  include 
independent estimates of national party positions from Benoit and Laver (2006) on three 
dimensions:  a  general  ideological  Left-Right  dimension,  a  EU  specific  dimension  (for 
member states), and positions on EU accession (for candidate countries).
21 Table 3 presents 
the results of several OLS regressions of the first and second W-NOMINATE dimension on 
the institutional dummies and the national party positions. Separate regressions are run for 
member states and candidate countries. In addition, I choose two units of analysis. The first 
set of regressions treats the delegate as the unit of analysis in order to distinguish between 
institutional affiliation. The second set of regressions pools delegates according to national 
party  affiliation  by  taking  the  mean  of  the  W-NOMINATE  positions  for  each  national 
party.  
                                                 
20 They also compare the national party positions in the Convention to expert estimates on substantive policy 
areas, and find slightly lower prediction error for policy areas than for Left-Right scores. 
21 The wording of the questions in the Benoit and Laver (2006) expert survey was as follows. LEFT-RIGHT: 
Please locate each party on a general left-right dimension, taking all aspects of party policy into account. Left 
(1),  Right  (20).  EU:  ACCOUNTABILITY  (EU-15  except  France  and  Ireland):  Promotes  the  direct 
accountability of the EU to citizens via institutions such as the European Parliament (1), Promotes the indirect 
accountability of the EU to citizens via their own national governments (20). EU: JOINING: (candidate states 
and potential EU entrants): Opposes joining the European Union (1), Favors joining the European Union (20).    24 
  The results confirm the previous interpretation of the dimensions. National party 
positions on the left-right dimension predict the first dimension for both member state and 
candidate country delegates. Institutional affiliation and EU policy positions do not explain 
this dimension. The coefficient for left-right party positions is statistically significant in 
both  the  delegate-level  and  national  party-level  regressions.  The  second  dimension,  in 
contrast, is explained by institutional affiliation and party positions on the EU, and not by 
left-right party positions.
22 The government and national parliament dummy variables are 
statistically significant for both member states and candidate countries. There is, however, a 
difference between member states and candidate countries. Member state delegate positions 
are also explained by their national party position on the European Union. In contrast, there 
is no significant effect of the position on joining the EU in the candidate countries.  
  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
  In sum, the regression analysis lends even more support to the view that the first 
dimension corresponds to an ideological Left-Right dimension and the second dimension to 
the issue of supranationalism, dividing delegates from supranational institutions and those 
from national ones as well as those who want more direct EU accountability and those who 
want more national accountability. 
  The  extracted  W-NOMINATE  positions  furthermore  confirms  previous 
assumptions that proposals revealed by President Giscard d'Estaing and the Praesidium 
were  located  centrally  in  the  issue  space  (Tsebelis  2005).  The  right  plot  in  Figure  3 
                                                 
22 Left-Right is statistically significant only in the delegate level regression for member states. The effect 
disappears if one uses the correct, pooled analysis (as national party positions vary only by party and not by 
delegate).   25 
demonstrates that Giscard revealed himself in fact as the median of the Convention as a 
whole and as the median of the Praesidium. With one exception, most Praesidium members 
endorsed the official proposals and did not propose many amendments, thus placing them 
centrally in the space.
23 
 
 
7.   Results: The Non-Representativeness of the Convention 
The  results  of  the  committee  compositions  tests  are  reported  in  Table  4.  It  lists  the 
calculated p-values for the fourteen committees calculated by the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique on the basis of one-dimensional W-NOMINATE scores. Sampled committees are 
drawn at random from the possible set of delegates, without any further constraint on the 
committee composition. The possible set of delegates are those who were members of the 
Convention by the time the respective committee was set-up. The table reports the p-values 
for the directional and non-directional outlier hypothesis as well as for the representative 
committee hypothesis.  
  The calculations for the directional outlier hypothesis show that the null hypothesis, 
that  there  is  nothing  systematic  about  committees,  can  be  rejected  for  two  committees 
(subsidiarity and external action). There are four additional committees that have p-values 
close to 5% (9, 11, DC 1 and DC 3). Although the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 
5% level for these committees, the p-values under 10% suggest that they are tending toward 
statistical significance. This means that about half of the committees were in fact preference 
outliers. Because the analysis is not based on committee specific preference estimates, a 
possible  critique  might  be  that  what  matters  less  is  the  ideological  direction  of  the 
                                                 
23 Note that the fact that Giscard is located centrally is not an artifact of the estimation. It means that his 
proposals  were  in  fact  amended  in  roughly  equal  terms  from  the  left  and  the  right,  as  well  as  from 
supranational institutions and member states.    26 
committee, but instead the relative distance to the floor median. Therefore, the p-values 
potentially overestimate the fact that a committee is outlying because they do not take into 
account  the  probability  of  observing  the  same  committee  on  the  other  side  of  the 
ideological spectrum. In the non-directional outlier test these probabilities are added. The 
random selection hypothesis can still be rejected for the committee on subsidiarity, but no 
longer for the committee on external action. However, there are still four committee with p-
values  close  to  5%,  suggesting  that  there  are  several  committees  with  significant 
ideological differences compared to the median of the Convention as a whole. However, 
this does not imply that the remaining committees are in fact representative. The p-values 
for the representative committee hypothesis are not significant except for one case: the 
committee on national parliaments. This committee can be considered representative of the 
parent chamber, an important finding given that the issues concerned greater involvement 
of those parliaments in the EU legislative decision making process. In sum, the analysis 
suggests more evidence for outlying committees than for representative committees on the 
first W-NOMINATE dimension.   
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
   
  As a robustness check, I determine whether the results are sensitive to the sampling 
strategy. The previous analysis of the committee system suggested that the Praesidium tried 
to  achieve  balanced  representation  of  the  component  groups  (Table  1).  Therefore,  all 
simulated committees should include at least one delegate from each component group, 
thus corresponding to the rule set-up by the steering committee. Simulating with constraints 
is not unproblematic, as this causes the simulated committees to be non-random samples. In   27 
the  completely-at-random  sampling  technique,  between  16%  and  78%  of  the  simulated 
committees were correct simulations. In the constrained simulation, this is set to 100% for 
each committee. The results confirm the previous results and are therefore not reported 
separately.  They  lend  somewhat  stronger  support  for  the  committee  outlier  hypothesis. 
There are three committees that can be considered directional outliers (having p-values 
smaller than 5%), one committee a non-directional outlier, and none a truly representative 
one.  
  However, the results must be interpreted carefully. When the null hypothesis of 
random selection is true, then there is a 5% chance of rejecting it in each of the 14 cases. 
This causes the rejection of the null hypothesis to occur an expected 0.7 times (= 14 x .05).  
Although the expected value is smaller than the two committees (directional) or the one 
committee (non-directional) found, the fact that it is only slightly smaller suggests that the 
evidence  might  still  be  consistent  with  a  hypothesis  that  all  committee  are  selected 
randomly. However, instead of adopting 5% as the significance level, one could set this 
level to 10% instead. Six committees are outliers according to this slightly weaker criterion 
(or five non-directional outliers), while the expected rejection by chance is 1.4 (= 14 x .1). 
In this case, the evidence provides stronger support for the outlier hypothesis. 
  Finally, the committee composition tests were also performed for the second W-
NOMINATE dimension which captures supranationalism (results not reported in table). 
Only three committees are statistically significant outliers on the second dimension (at 5% 
level): the working group on simplification, Social Europe, and the Court of Justice. For all 
three committees, the outlying direction is toward more supranationalism.   
  The estimation results allow for a distinction between committees leaning to the left 
and to the right given that the first dimension is best predicted by left-right national party   28 
positions. Table 4 lists whether the committee median is to the left or to the right of the 
Convention median. Out of the six committees that are statistically significant outliers in 
the directional test, five have median delegate positions to the left and only one has  a 
median delegate position the right. A previous analysis of the Working Group on Social 
Europe has  suggested it was “significantly slanted to the left” (Brown 2003, p.3). The 
empirical  analysis  of  the  representativeness  of  working  groups  in  the  Convention  has 
corroborated  this.  In  addition,  the  results  suggest  that  this  working  group  had  a  more 
supranational  preference, as did the group on simplification and on the Court of Justice.  
 
8.  Discussion: The Convention, the Constitution and Ratification  
In the midst of creating the European Convention, EU governments emphasized that the 
Convention should be more transparent and open than previous IGCs. Thus, the rationale of 
the entire constitution making process was to install a body that would attempt to represent 
more closely the different political components of the EU. While it was not a goal of this 
study  to  determine  whether  delegates  actually  represented  these  groups  accurately,  the 
results do suggest that the Convention was organized in a way that was unrepresentative of 
the parent chamber and biased to the left. Out of six outlying drafting committees, five 
were significantly to the left of the Convention median. In contrast, the Presidency of the 
Convention revealed itself as a representative body, with Giscard d’Estaing taking a median 
position both in the Praesidium and in the Convention, confirming assumptions made in 
previous studies (Tsebelis, 2005; Tsebelis and Proksch, 2007).  
  What  are  the  implications  of  this  configuration  for  the  European  constitution-
making  process  and  its  obstacles?  It  has  been  argued  that  Giscard’s  central  position 
together  with  strong  agenda-setting  instruments  gave  him  the  opportunity  to  modify   29 
Convention  proposals  to  a  position  closer  to  his  (ibid.).  Out  of  all  committees  in  the 
Convention, the Working Group on Social Europe had the lowest acceptance rate of its 
proposals,  with  only  every  third  proposal  getting  endorsed  by  Giscard  and  fellow 
Praesidium  members.  At  the  same  time,  the  lack  of  attention  to  social  issues  in  the 
constitution was the most prominent reason for its rejection in France. Survey results report 
that French “no voters” had strong concerns about social issues. Of the top five reasons 
why the French voted “no”, four were related to socio-economic issues.
24 These included 
concerns about current and future unemployment in France, the fact that the constitution 
appears too liberal in economic terms, and that it did not contain enough “Social Europe”.  
  Given the facts that (1) the Convention committee on social issues had a bias to the 
left and towards more supranationalism, (2) the Presidency of the Convention was centrally 
located with strong agenda-setting powers, and (3) French voters rejected the constitution 
mainly for social reasons, the question of Giscard’s role in the Convention gains entirely 
new significance. Until the very end of the Convention, members of the “Social Europe” 
working group tried to make sure that their proposals, endorsed by majority in the working 
group,  would  find  a  way  into  the  draft  constitution.  The  working  group  expressed  its 
concern vis-à-vis Giscard in a letter stating “that the large consensus from this working 
group, that was confirmed during the plenary debate, has not been sufficiently taken into 
account in the draft articles of the Constitution.”
25 Many social policy issues (e.g. specific 
objectives,  values,  new  ways  of  coordinating  member  state  policies  through  the  open 
method of coordination, extension of QMV) did not make it into the final constitution.  
                                                 
24 Flash Eurobarometer 171: "The European Constitution:  Post-referendum survey in France", available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl171_fr.pdf. The other cited reason to vote "no" was dissatisfaction 
with the French political establishment. 
25  European  Convention  document  CONV  780/03,  June  2003,  available  at 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00780en03.pdf   30 
  Giscard  and  the  Convention  might  have  achieved  one  of  the  most  significant 
political successes in EU history by drafting the Constitution. The document simplifies the 
existing  Treaties,  introduces  major  institutional  change,  and  many  would  agree  that  it 
would  make  the  EU  a  more  governable  body.  The  institutional  organization  of  the 
Convention, however, might be partially to blame for the failure of the constitution. Even 
though  it  was  more  open  and  broad  than  previous  Intergovernmental  Conferences,  it 
promoted delegates to self-select onto committees according to their ideological position 
causing preference outliers. While this process produced concrete proposals, they were not 
taken  into  account  for  issues  related  to  “Social  Europe”.  Voters  in  other  countries,  in 
particular the UK, might not wish for a constitution with additional social elements, but the 
French appeared to do so. 
 
9.  Conclusion 
This study focused on the institutional organization of the European Convention and its 
impact on the constitutional drafting process. It constituted a departure from earlier studies 
of constitutional assemblies, which largely ignored the importance of the procedures and 
rules  and  their  effect  on  outcomes. The  analysis  concentrated  on  the  particular  role  of 
committees and leads to the following conclusions about the politics of EU constitution 
making. 
  First,  the  constitutional  drafting  process  was  under  strong  control  of  a  steering 
committee. This institutional feature distinguishes the European constitutional convention 
from a legislative setting. In legislatures, majoritarian politics determines control of the 
floor leadership. In the EU Convention, an exogenously chosen steering committee had 
strong agenda-setting power and procedural control. This steering committee was able to   31 
create committees and shape their initial mandates. Second, the analysis of the committee 
system showed that working groups and discussion circles were important social choice 
institutions in the European Convention. They participated actively in the constitutional 
drafting process. Not only did committees deal with significant issues, but they proposed 
concrete  recommendations  to  the  leadership  of  the  convention,  which  accepted  them 
overwhelmingly.  Third,  the  committee  assignment  itself  was  largely  driven  by  self-
selection of the delegates, suggesting that committees might have been preference outliers. 
However,  the  leadership  attempted  to  adjust  the  committee  size  to  achieve  a  balanced 
representation,  lending  support  to  the  representative  committee  hypothesis.  Delegate 
positions  were  estimated  from  amendment  endorsements  in  the  convention  in  order  to 
compare committee and floor preferences. The Monte Carlo simulation approach provided 
more evidence for outlying committees than for representative ones. Almost half of the 
committees  can  be  considered  left-leaning  outliers,  and  of  those  three  were  also  more 
supranational than the Convention floor.    32 
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Table 1. Committee Composition in the European Convention 
Committee  Issue Area  Size  Meetings  Presidency  Commission  EP  MS  
Government 
MS  
National 
Parliament 
CC 
Government 
CC 
National 
Parliament 
Observers 
WG 1  Subsidiarity  35  7  0 
(0%) 
1 
(2.9%) 
5 
(14.3%) 
4 
(11.4%) 
10 
(28.6%) 
2 
(5.7%) 
9 
(25.7%) 
4 
(11.4%) 
WG 2  Charter of Fundamental 
Rights 
33  7  0 
(0%) 
1 
(3.0%) 
3 
(9.1%) 
4 
(12.1%) 
9 
(27.3%) 
3 
(9.1%) 
11 
(33.3%) 
2 
(6.1%) 
WG 3  Legal Personality  30  7  1 
(3.3%) 
1 
(3.3%) 
6 
(20.0%) 
6 
(20.0%) 
5 
(16.7%) 
6 
(20.0%) 
4 
(13.3%) 
1 
(3.3%) 
WG 4  National Parliaments  35  9  0 
(0%) 
1 
(2.9%) 
5 
(14.3%) 
1 
(2.9%) 
13 
(37.1%) 
1 
(2.9%) 
13 
(37.1%) 
1 
(2.9%) 
WG 5  Complementary 
Competences 
33  6  0 
(0%) 
1 
(3.0%) 
5 
(15.2%) 
5 
(15.2%) 
10 
(30.3%) 
4 
(12.1%) 
8 
(24.2%) 
0 
(0%) 
WG 6  Economic Governance  36  10  0 
(0%) 
1 
(2.8%) 
7 
(19.4%) 
8 
(22.2%) 
9 
(25.0%) 
6 
(16.7%) 
2 
(5.6%) 
3 
(8.3%) 
WG 7  External Action  50  10  1 
(2.0%) 
1 
(2.0%) 
7 
(14.0%) 
13 
(26.0%) 
10 
(20.0%) 
8 
(16.0%) 
8 
(16.0%) 
2 
(4.0%) 
WG 8  Defense  40  9  1 
(2.5%) 
1 
(2.5%) 
4 
(10.0%) 
6 
(15.0%) 
14 
(35.0%) 
3 
(7.5%) 
11 
(27.5%) 
0 
(0%) 
WG 9  Simplification  39  7  1 
(2.6%) 
1 
(2.6%) 
14 
(35.9%) 
1 
(2.6%) 
9 
(23.1%) 
3 
(7.7%) 
5 
(12.8%) 
5 
(12.8%) 
WG 10  Freedom, Security and 
Justice 
41  8  0 
(0%) 
1 
(2.4%) 
6 
(14.6%) 
6 
(14.6%) 
13 
(31.7%) 
5 
(12.2%) 
9 
(22.0%) 
1 
(2.4%) 
WG 11  Social Europe  71  5  0 
(0%) 
1 
(1.4%) 
16 
(22.5%) 
9 
(12.7%) 
22 
(31.0%) 
3 
(4.2%) 
14 
(19.7%) 
6 
(8.5%) 
DC 1  Court of Justice  20  4  0 
(0%) 
1 
(5.0%) 
5 
(25.0%) 
5 
(25.0%) 
7 
(35.0%) 
0 
(0%) 
2 
(10.0%) 
0 
(0%) 
DC 2  Budgetary Procedure  19  3  0 
(0%) 
1 
(5.3%) 
6 
(31.6%) 
5 
(26.3%) 
5 
(26.3%) 
2 
(10.5%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
DC 3  Own Resources  21  4  1 
(4.8%) 
1 
(4.8%) 
4 
(19.0%) 
7 
(33.3%) 
6 
(28.6%) 
2 
(9.5%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
Mean  36  7                 
Mean Committee Seat Share      1.1%  3.1%  18.9%  17.1%  28.3%  9.6%  17.7%  4.3% 
Mean Convention Seat Share      1.4%  1.8%  14.4%  13.5%  27.0%  11.7%  24.3%  5.9% 
Note: WG=Working Group, DC=Discussion Circle, Presidency=Presidency of the Convention, EP=European Parliament, MS=Member States, CC=Candidate Countries.  34 
Table 2. Success Rates of Committee Proposals  
Committee  Committee Recommendations
1  Options proposed by Committee
2 
  Proposed by 
Committee 
Proposed by 
Praesidium 
Success 
Rate 
Number of 
issues 
 Proposed by 
Praesidium 
Success  
Rate 
WG 1  14  12  .86  0  0  - 
WG 2  10  10  1  2  2  1 
WG 3  8  6  .75  0  0  - 
WG 4  14  8  .57  0  0  - 
WG 5  24  15  .63  0  0  - 
WG 6  7  4  .57  8  8  1 
WG 7  29  24  .83  0  0  - 
WG 8  15  12  .80  1  1  1 
WG 9  28  24  .86  2  2  1 
WG 10  33  32  .97  1  1  1 
WG 11  21  7  .33  1  1  1 
DC 1  12  10  .83  4  4  1 
DC 2  22  20  .91  3  3  1 
DC 3  6  6  1  1  1  1 
Mean  17.4  13.6  .78  1.6  1.6  1 
(1) Committee recommendations are proposals included in the committee report. The success rate is the number of 
recommendations proposed by the Praesidium divided by the number of recommendations.  
(2) Options proposed by committee are issues for which the committees proposed several alternatives. The success 
rate reflects how often the Praesidium proposed one of the committee alternatives.    35 
Table 3. Predicting Convention W-NOMINATE scores (OLS regressions) 
Dimension  1
st Dimension  2
nd Dimension 
Unit of analysis  Delegate  National party  Delegate  National party 
Model  Member 
states 
Candidate 
countries 
Member 
states 
Candidate 
countries 
Member 
states 
Candidate 
countries 
Member 
states 
Candidate 
countries 
                 
Institutional Affiliation                 
Government  
(dummy) 
-.191 
(.145) 
-.052 
(.151)      -.482 
(.104)*** 
-.308 
(.097)**     
National Parliament 
(dummy) 
-.000 
(.110)        -.316 
(.079)***       
                 
Ideology                 
Left-Right 
.077 
(.016)*** 
.040 
(.014)*** 
.057 
(.017)*** 
.043 
(.017)** 
.026 
(.011)** 
-.008 
(.009) 
.014 
(.012) 
.001 
(.011) 
EU accountability  
-.026 
(0.187)    -.008 
(.021)    -.072 
(.013)***    -.062 
(.015)***   
EU accession    .005 
(.017)    -.004 
(.024)    .012  
(.011)    -.000 
(.016) 
                 
Constant 
-.809 
(.172)*** 
-.658 
(.294)** 
-.837 
(.181)*** 
-.502 
(.413) 
.772 
(.123)*** 
-.168 
(.188) 
.528 
(.133)*** 
-.058 
(.273) 
                 
Observations  100  61  52  42  100  61  52  42 
Adjusted R
2  .22  .10  .23  .10  .35  .11  .27  -.05 
Note: Significance levels: **p   .05, ***p   .001. Ideology measures are expert survey scores from Benoit and Laver 
(2006). The set of observations for member states include government representatives, national parliamentarians and 
supranational delegates (baseline category). The set of observations for candidate countries includes government 
representatives  and  national  parliamentarians  (baseline  category).  Delegates/national  parties  for  which  the 
Benoit/Laver  expert  survey  does  not  indicate  a  position  are  not  included  in  the  analysis.Table 4. Committee Composition Hypotheses: Monte Carlo Simulation results (Single W-NOMINATE dimension
1) 
      Directional Outliers  Non-directional Outliers  Representative committee   
  Committee  Size  p-valued.outlier  p-valuend.outlier  p-valuerepresent  Correct 
     
Direction 
of comm. 
median 
no 
constraint  constraint
2 
no 
constraint  constraint
2 
no 
constraint  constraint
2 
simulations
3 
1  Subsidiarity  35  Left  0.0491  0.0403  0.9509  0.9597  0.9509  0.9597  0.4449 
2  Charter  33  Right  0.3767  0.3302  0.1803  0.2601  0.1803  0.2601  0.4204 
3  Legal Personality  30  Left  0.1526  0.1352  0.8445  0.8610  0.8445  0.8610  0.3722 
4 
National 
Parliaments  35  Right  0.4894  0.4417  0.0238  0.0952  0.0238  0.0952  0.4482 
5 
Complementary 
Competence  33  Right  0.3622  0.3235  0.2022  0.3879  0.2022  0.3879  0.4215 
6 
Economic 
Governance  36  Left  0.2312  0.2405  0.7574  0.5869  0.7574  0.5869  0.4669 
7  External Action  50  Right  0.0083  0.0065  0.7237  0.8056  0.7237  0.8056  0.6273 
8  Defense  40  Left  0.1999  0.2079  0.7957  0.7841  0.7957  0.7841  0.5159 
9  Simplification  39  Left  0.0640  0.0534  0.9360  0.9465  0.9360  0.9465  0.5067 
10  Security and Justice  41  Left  0.2581  0.2722  0.7369  0.5861  0.7369  0.5861  0.5351 
11  Social Europe  71  Left  0.0613  0.0572  0.9387  0.9428  0.9387  0.9428  0.7865 
12  DC Court of Justice  20  Left  0.0807  0.0548  0.9157  0.9427  0.9157  0.9427  0.1888 
13 
DC Budgetary 
Procedure  19  Left  0.0714  0.0487  0.9252  0.9480  0.9252  0.9480  0.1671 
14  DC Own Resources  21  Right  0.2446  0.1827  0.3615  0.6639  0.3615  0.6639  0.2108 
1 Results based on single W-NOMINATE dimension. Results do not change when using the first dimension from a two-dimensional extraction.
  
2 Sampling with constraints means each of the 20,000 simulated committees must include at least one representative from the component groups. 
3 Correct simulations is the proportion of the 20,000 simulated committees (no constraint) which meet the constraint. 
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Figure 1. Constitutional Drafting Process in the European Convention 
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Figure 2. Committee Composition Hypotheses  
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Figure 3. Delegate Positions in the European Convention  
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APPENDIX. Data Coding Procedure: From amendments to W-NOMINATE scores 
 
The estimation of ideological scores for each Convention delegate through W-NOMINATE 
using endorsements for amendments involved several steps described below. 
 
I.  The primary data: Proposed amendment documents  
The analysis is based on all 3,101 amendment documents proposed by delegates in the 
European  Convention  for  the  following  sections  of  the  Constitution:  Preamble,  Part  I 
(Definition and Objectives of the Union, Fundamental rights and citizenship of the Union, 
Union competences and actions, Institutions, Exercise of Union competence, Democratic 
Life  of  the  Union,  Union  Finances,  Union  and  its  Immediate  Environment,  Union 
Membership),  Part  II  (Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights),  Protocol  on  Principles  of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, Protocol on Role of national parliaments. The amendment 
documents are available at the online archive of the European Convention (http://european-
convention.eu.int/amendemTrait.asp?lang=EN). 
 
II. Identifying issues in the amendments 
All  3,101  amendments  were  hand-coded  using  the  following  approach:  an  issue  was 
defined as a substantive amendment proposed by at least two Convention delegates. This 
definition captures identical amendments that were proposed in several documents. In other 
words, if the same amendment was proposed several times, it was only included once in the 
dataset and all names of the delegates endorsing the issue were recorded. Note that one 
particular amendment document could include one or several issues. In the latter case, the 
issues were coded separately. In total, 491 issues were identified in the 3,101 proposed 
amendment documents and included in the dataset.  
 
III. Exclusion of amendments  
A substantive issue was defined as non-stylistic, non-linguistic, and non-grammatical. The 
three  latter  types  of  amendments  were  thus  not  coded.  Often,  such  amendments  were 
proposed by only one delegate (thus excluding the amendment under the first criterion that 
at least two need to propose it). In the remaining instances, it was almost always clear that 
the amendments did not reflect any substantive position on an issue, but were intended by 
the  authors  to  improve  the  overall  drafting  quality  of  the  constitutional  text.  For  the 
remaining amendments, a certain subjective evaluation had to be made about which ones 
are substantive and which ones are not. For instance, the amendment to replace the term 
“constitution” with the term “simplifying treaty” was considered to be linguistic, and not 
substantive  (for  this  particular  amendment,  see  http://european-
convention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/10100/Part1KirkhopeEN.pdf).  While  there  may  be 
substantive reasons behind the amendment (e.g. the author does not like transfer of more 
sovereignty to the EU, etc.), the working assumption was that the substantive aspect would 
be picked up by other amendments (e.g. this particular author proposed to delete the articles 
on the post of European foreign minister). 
 
IV.  Dealing with different languages 
Most  amendments  were  proposed  in  English,  French  and  German  and  could  be  coded 
readily. In rare instances, an amendment was proposed in other languages (there was no 
official translation service for amendments), such as Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, 
Greek,  Danish,  Finnish.  In  these  cases,  amendments  were  translated  using  an  online   38 
translation  service  (http://babelfish.altavista.com/).  Because  the  amendments  were  short, 
their content could be retrieved and coded accordingly. 
 
V. Issue endorsements  
a.  Once the issues were identified, they were coded into a matrix with 491 issue rows. 
Each row contained a list of delegate names endorsing the issue. A PERL program 
identified the delegate names via pattern matching. This way the issue-delegate data 
matrix included the names of the delegates who were members of the Convention at 
any given time in the columns (rows=491 issues, columns=269 delegate names). Each 
issue-delegate  cell  was  coded  as  “1”  if  the  delegate  endorsed  the  issue,  and  “0” 
otherwise.  
b.  The coding took into account of exits and entries of delegates in the Convention. In 
total, 37 delegates had left the European Convention prior to the amendment process 
(before  02/2003)  and  were  replaced  by  somebody  else.  The  appendix  to  the  Draft 
Constitution  specifies  when  a  delegate  left  the  Convention  (http://european-
convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf). The names of these delegates were 
deleted from the data matrix. Leaving them in the dataset would bias the estimation 
results (they would be falsely coded as not endorsing any issue, even though they were 
not  members  of  the  Convention  anymore,  and  therefore  could  not  express  their 
preferences). The list of these delegates include: Akyol, Barrau, Bastarreche, Birzniece, 
Cullen, Dalinkevicius, de Castro, de Vallera, Eser, Gaber, Glotz, Hallengren, Hamzik, 
Idrac,  Inkens,  Ioakimidis,  Jinga,  Kavan,  Keltosova,  Kocaoglou,  MacSharry,  Maior, 
Martonyi, Medalinskas, Moscovici, Nahtigal, Pavilionis, Pleuger, Sebej, Sprindzuks, 
Tekin, van Baalen, van Mierlo, Vimont, Yilmaz A, Yilmaz M, Zaplana. 
c.  In addition, 9 delegates were replaced during the amendment process (after 02/2003). 
The entries for each delegate and his/her replacement were combined and added into a 
single 'delegate pair' column. This procedure is necessary, because the amendments as 
posted  on  the  European  Convention  website  do  not  include  dates.  It  is  therefore 
impossible to estimate separate positions. The delegate pairs are: Kurzmann-Mainoni, 
Senff-Gerhards,  Soederman-Diamandouros,  Yakis-Guel,  Haenni-Toenisson, 
Kreitzberg-Lang, Taerno-Reinsalu, Korhonen-Takkula, Vanhanen-Vilen. 
d.  The final step involved formatting the data matrix for W-NOMINATE.  
 
VI.  W-NOMINATE estimation 
Two versions of W-NOMINATE were run on the 491 issues (program code available at 
http://voteview.com/w-nominate.htm).  The  first  version  extracted  two  dimensions,  the 
second version extracted one dimension.  
 
 